PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING DISCRETION AND
CONGRESSIONAL CONTROLS
Louis Fis m.*
On the basis of the Constitution and traditional legislative prerogatives, Congress

lays claim to exclusive control over the purse. Nevertheless, while it is up to Congress to appropriate funds, it is also true that the President and the executive branch
enjoy considerable discredoY as to how those funds are spent. Existing studies tell
us how the President formulates the budget and how Congress acts on the budget
requests he submits. Surprisingly, we know relatively little about how the money,
once appropriated, is actually spent. A notable exception in this field is a work by
Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., published three decades ago.1
The purpose of this article is to present a more contemporary account of executive
spentding discretion, to show its impact on public policy, and to point to some of the
techniques and procedures used by Congress to preserve its power of the purse.
Although the President's spending discretion may seem essentially a twentieth
century phenomenon, resulting primarily from the Budget and Accounting Act of
1921
it has been a problem since George Washington's first administration. A
number of early examples underscore that fact and add historical perspective and

balance to this presentation.
The material is organized under seven main headings: lump-sum appropriations,
covert financing, transfers between classes, reprogramming, transfers in time, impoundment, and unauthorized commitments. Within those broad categories are
smaller sections on such topics as contingency funds, military assistance, no-year
money, accelerated procurement, and coercive deficiencies. A number of these
categories overlap, resulting in a certain arbitrariness in organization.
I
LuMp-Sum

APPRoPiaATioNs

A. History
Executive spending discretion produced sharp partisan dashes during the early
years of the national government. We are told that the Federalists advocated
executive discretion while the Jeffersonian Republicans insisted on legislative restraint.
That kind of distinction is quite artificial, fabricated more from party rhetoric than
from administrative practice.
* Analyst, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. Author, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS:
PowERs AND POLIcy (1972).

The views expressed in this article are those of the author, not of the Congressional Research Service.
This article is based on the author's paper presented at the 1971 annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association.
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For instance, after Jefferson's election as President in i8oi, he told Congress that
it would be prudent to appropriate "specific sums to every specific purpose susceptible
of definition." 3 Hamilton promptly denounced that recommendation as "preposterous," declaring that nothing was "more wild or of more inconvenient tendency."
He was indeed correct. Jefferson's Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, admitted
that it was impossible for Congress to foresee, "in all its details, the necessary application of moneys, and a reasonable discretion should be allowed to the proper executive
department." Jefferson himself, as President, recognized that "too minlute a specification has its evil as well as a too general one," and thought it better for Congress to
appropriate in gross while trusting in executive discretion.4
Lump-sum appropriations become particularly noticeable during emergency
periods of war and national depression. During the Civil War, an act provided for
$5o million to pay two- and three-year volunteers; $26 million for subsistence; another
$14 million to cover transportation and supplies; and $76 million for an assortment of
items, to be divided among them "as the exigencies of the service may require...."5
During World War I, President Wilson received $ioo million for "national security
and defense" (to be spent at his discretion) and $25o million to be applied to construction costs under the Emergency Shipping Fund.6
Emergency relief programs during the Great Depression set aside billions
to be spent at the President's discretion. An act of 1934 appropriated $950 million for
emergency relief programs and the Civil Works Program, making the money available "for such projects and/or purposes and under such rules antd regulations as the
President in his discretion may prescribe ....,,7The Emergency Relief Appropriation
Act of 1935 appropriated $4 billion for eight general classes of projects, the money
to be used "in the discretion and under the direction of the President."' A study
published inf the June-July 1937 issue of The CongressionalDigest estimated that
Congress, since March 4, 1933, had given President Roosevelt discretionary spending
authority over $15,428,9 8,815 . That compared with a total of $i,687,Ii2,500 in discretionary spending power given to all Presidents in' the periods from 1789 to I933?
B. Budget Itemization
Lump-sum figures do not always reflect the actual scope of Presidential spending
discretion. For instance, legislative control over lump-sum appropriations can be
exercised by holding the President to his itemized budget requests, even though
that itemization is not included in the appropriation bill. The Budget and Account8I U.S. PRESIDENT, A CoMPILATioN OF MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 329 (J. Richardson

ed. I896).
A7 THE WoRxs OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 256-57 (H. Lodge ed. 1904); 3 THE VIuNGS
117 (H. Adams ed. 1879); 4 THE VRINs os THoMAs JEFFERsoN 529-30, 533

GALLATIN

ington ed. 1854).
'Act of Feb. 25, x862, ch. 32,- 12 Stat. 344.
'Act of Apr. 17, 1917, ch. 3, 40 Stat 28; Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 29, 40 Stat. 182.
"Act of Feb. 15, 1934, ch. 13, 48 Stat. 351.
'Act of Apr. 8, 1935, ch. 48, 49 Stat xr5.
9 x6 CONG. DIG. 172 (1937).
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ing Act of 192i provided that estimates for lump-sum appropriations "shall be accompanied by statements showing, in such detail and form as may be necessary to
inform Congress, the manner of expenditure of such appropriations and of the
corresponding appropriations for the fiscal year in progress and the last completed
fiscal year."' 0

The use of executive budget estimates as a substitute for line-item appropriations
is illustrated by the public works appropriations act of 1971. A lump sum of $1.9
billion was made available to the Atomic Energy Commission for "operating expenses.""1 Theoretically, the money could be spent for just about anything, and yet
there exists a moral understanding between the Commission: and the appropriations
subcommittees that the money will be spent in accordance with the Commission's
budget estimates, as amended by congressional actions and directives included in
committee reports. This kind of nonstatutory control depends on a "keep the
faith" attitude among agency officials and a trust by subcommittees in the integrity
of administrators. If the AEC were to violate that trust and abuse its discretionary
powers, it would face the prospect the next year of budget cutbacks and line-item
appropriations.
C. Contingency Funds
Since future events cannot be anticipated, or anticipated with great precision,
Congress has had to provide special fun~ds to cover contingencies and emergencies.
Emergency funds were particularly large during World War II. In statutes from
June 13, 1940, to October 26, I942, Congress appropriated a total of $425 million

in funds for "emergencies affecting the national security and defense,' 2 plus another
$320 million in funds for temporary shelters in areas suffering from the housing
shortage brought about by the war 1 3
To cite a contemporary example of emergency funding, President Johnson decided in July 1965 to increase American fighting forces in Vietnam. This decision
resulted in a $1.
7 billion Emergency Fund for Southeast Asia over which the
executive branch enjoyed complete discretion'. Upon determination by the President
that such action was necessary in connection with military activities, the Secretary
of Defense could transfer the money to any appropriation available to the Defense
Department for military functions.' 4
The Defense Department also receives money for a separate Emergency Fund,
"10 Act of June 1o, 1921, ch. x8, § 204(b), 42 Statt 21.
" Pub. L. No. 92-134, tit. I, 85 Stat. 365 (Oct. 5, 1971).
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" Act of Sept. 29, 1965, Pub. L. No.
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used primarily to support the exploitation of new scientific developments and technological breakthroughs. The House and the Senate appropriations committees have
both criticized the use of the fund for other than emergency purposes. In 1963 the
House Appropriations Committee complained that the Emergency Fund "has been
resorted to in too many instances when no scientific or technical breakthrough was
involved. It seems that the Emergency Fund has been considered by some as a
general purpose fund from which to finance low priority or unbudgeted programs."'"
Two years later the Senate Appropriations Committee observed that the fund was
tapped frequently during the closing weeks of the fiscal year: "Such action lends
credence to the suspicion that the fund is being employed for other than emergency
purposes which would tend to subvert the congressional review and appropriation
process.""' From a level of $x5o million in fiscal 1963, the Emergency Fund for the
Department of Defense dropped to $50 million by fiscal 1972.
Other sources of emergency funds are found in statutes that provide for disaster
relief. The Federal Disaster Act of 195o and subsequent statutes offer financial
assistance to state and local governments whenever the President declares a major
disaster. From 1951 through 197 o, the President issued 338 declarations and allocated
$857 million from the disaster relief fundY
Contingency funds are sometimes used for purposes not even vaguely contemplated by Congress when it appropriated the money. For instance, on March i, i96r,
President Kennedy issued an executive order establishing the Peace Corps.' s Not
until seven months later did Congress appropriate funds for the agency.' 0 In the
meantime, the President financed the Peace Corps by using more than a million'
dollars in contingency funds from the Mutual Security Act.20 Several years later,
the sum of $450,000 was taken from the Defense Department's contingency fund to
pay a portion of the expenses of the President's Commission on Civil Disorders.2 '
When the executive branch abuses its authority over contingency funds, Congress can reassert its control over the purse by passing more stringent legislation.
As an example in a 1959 report the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House
Appropriations Committee- specifically denied funds for an Incentive Investment
Program which the Administration had proposed. The subcommittee's denial was
omitted from the final appropriation bill passed by Congress, at which point the
Administration proceeded to use money from the President's contingency fund to
initiate the program. The House Appropriations Committee, charging that the
contingency fund was being used to nullify the actions of Congress, recommended
H.R. REP. No. 439, 88th Cong., ist Sess. 63 (1963).
0

S. REP. No. 625, 89th Cong., ist Sess. 53 (1965).

"Act of Sept. 30, 1950, ch. X125, 64 Stat. iiog; Act of Nov. 6, x966, Pub. L. No. 89-769, 8o Stat.
1316; Act of Dec. 31, 197o, Pub. L. No. 9x-6o6, 84 Statt 1744. The number of declarations and total
allocations were obtained from the Office of Emergency Preparedness. Figures include actions by the
Housing and Home Finance Agency in 1951-52 when it administered disaster relief programs.
"8 Exec. Order No. 10,924, 3 C.F.R. 447 (ig6i).
19
Act of Sept. 30, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-329, tit. V, 75 Stat 72.
"0 See H.R. REP. No. 1115, 87 th Cong., ist Sess. 66 (1961).
21S. PUP. No. 1576, 9oth Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1968).
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language the next year to curb this executive practice. The resulting appropriation
bill stipulated that none of the funds appropriated for the President's special authority
and contingency fund "shall be used for any project or activity for which an estimate
has been submitted to Congress and which estimate has been rejected." The Act also
prohibited the use of any of the funds to finance any of the activities under the
Investment Incentive Program.2
II
COVERT FINANCING

Appropriations during World War II were often lumped together under a general heading to prevent analysis by the enemy. The atomic bomb project, for instance, was financed for several years from funds set aside for "Engineer Service,
Army" and "Expediting Production." When larger sums for manufacturing the
bomb could no longer be concealed by such methods, a few legislative leaders were
told of the project and asked to provide funds without letting other legislators know
how the money would be spent. Accordingly, the money was tucked away unnoticed in an appropriation bill. Total appropriations for the Manhattan Project
came to over $2 billion. Members of the House Appropriations Committee told Elias
Huzar that about $8oo million had been spent on the project before they knew
23
about it.

According to the Budget arnd Accounting Procedures Act of i95o, it is the policy
of Congress that the accounting of the government shall provide "full disclosure of
the results of financial operation% adequate financial information needed in the
management of operations and the formulation and execution of the Budget, and
effective control over income, expenditures, funds, property, and other assets." 24
Despite that general policy, it has been estimated that, in a fiscal 1972 budget of
5
$229.2 billion, secret funds may amount to as much as $I5-20 billion?
A. Free World Forces
The financing of the war in Vietnam illustrates how billions can be spent
for programs known to relatively few Congressmen. 8 In September 1966, President
Johnson expressed his "deep admiration as well as that of the American people
for the action recently taken by the Philippines to send a civic action' group of
2,000 men to assist the Vietnamese in resisting aggression and rebuilding their
country."2" Other announcements from the White House created the impression
22H.R. REP. No. 712, 86th Cong., ist Sess. 8 (x959);

H.R. REP. No. 1798, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.

13 (i96o). Act of Sept. 2, ig6o, Pub. L. No. 86-704, § IO6, 74 Stat. 777. See also S. REP. No. 1849,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. so (x96o) and IV. Moaaow, CONGRESSIONAL Cou~srrEEs 165-67 (z969).
2
"E. HuzAt, THm Poas AND THa Sworn, 338 (1950). See J. MAiRmTN, My Fnisr FIFrY YEsas IN
PoLTIcs oo-o (ig6o); L. GRovES, Now IT CAN BE TOLD 360-6z (1962).
"'Act Of Sept. 12, I950, ch. 946, § III, 46 Stat. 834.
"5 CONG. Q. Waa x.y REP., Aug. 21, 1971, at 1786.
"Most of the material in the following sections on covert financing first appeared in Fisher, Executive
Shell Game: Hiding Billions From Congress, Tm NATIoN, Nov. 15, 1971, at 486. This article is reprinted in 117 CONG. REC. SI8,232 (daily ed. Nov. i, 1971) (inserted by Senator Fulbright).
272 U.S. PRESIDENT, PUBLIC PaERs oF THE PRESIDENTS: LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1966, at 1029 (1967).
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that not only the Philippines but also Thailand, South Korea, and other members of
the "Free World Forces" had volunteered their assistance.
i.Congressional Investigations
However, hearings held by the Symington subcommittee in 1969 and 1970
revealed that the United States had offered sizable subsidies to these countries. It was
learned that the Philippines had received river patrol craft, engineer equipment, a
special overseas allowance for their soliders sent to Vietnam, aid additional equipment to strengthen Philippine forces at home. It cost the United States $38.8 million
to send one Filipino construction battalion to Vietnam. Senator Fulbright remarked
that it was his own feeling that "all we did was go over and hire their soldiers
in order to support our then administration's view that so many people were in
28
sympathy with our war in Vietnam."
The Philippine Government denied that U.S. contributions represented a subsidy
or a fee in return for the sending of the construction battalion, but an investigation
by the General Accounting Office (GAO) confirmed that "quid pro quo assistance"
had indeed been given. Moreover, there was evidence that the Johnson Administration had increased other forms of military and economic aid to the Philippines
for its commitment of a battalion to Vietnam."
The Symington subcommittee also uncovered an agreement that the Johnson
Administration had made with the Royal Thai Government in x967 to cover any
additional costs conaected with the sending of Thai soldiers to Vietnam. The State
Department estimated that U.S. support to Thai forces-including payment of overseas allowances-came -to approximately $200 million. A number of other expenses
were also involved, such as modernization of Thai forces and the deployment of
an anti-aircraft Hawk battery in Thailand."0 The Foreign Ministry of Thailand denied
that the United States had offered payments to induce Thailand to send armed forces
to Vietnam. Nevertheless, GAO investigators reported that U.S. funds had been
used for such purposes as the training of Thai troops, payment of overseas allowances,
and payment of separation bonuses to Thai soldiers who had served in Vietnam.
An interim GAO report estimated that the U.S. government had invested "probably
more than $260 million in equipment, allowances, subsistence, construction, military
sales concessions, and other support to the Thais for their contribution' under the
Free World Military Assistance program to Vietnam."'
U.S. subsidies were used once again to support the sending of South Korean forces
to Vietnam. Assistance included equipment to modernize Korean forces at home,
2s Hearings on United States Security Agreements and commitments Abroad: The Republic of the
Philippines (part x) Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, gist Cong., ist Sess. 261, 358

(,969).

: N.Y. Tunes, Nov. 20, 5969, at 13 col. i; 1x6 CoNG. Ruc. S4453 (daily ed. Mar. 25, i970).
oHearings on United Staes Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Kingdom of Thailand
(part 3) Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 9st Cong., ist Sess. 625-57 (1969).
"i N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 5969, at xo, col. 1; 116 CONG. Rac. S19,743 (daily ad. Dec. 9, 1970).
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equipment and all additional costs to cover the deployment of Korean forces in
Vietnam, additional loans from the Agency for International Development, and increased ammunition and communications facilities in Korea. To assure that the
sending of Korean forces to Vietnam would not weaken the defensive capabilities
of the Republic of Korea, the Johnson Administration agreed to finance the training
and replacement of forces deployed in Vietnam and to improve South Korea's antiinfiltration capability. From fiscal 1965 to fiscal 1970, U.S. costs resulting from the
dispatch of Korean forces to Vietnm were estimated at $927.5 million 3 2
2.

Legislative Authority and Restrictions

The legal basis for this assistance to Free World Forces in Vietnam goes back to
authorization and appropriation statutes of 1966. Funds were made available to
support Vietnamese "and other free world forces in Vietnam, and related costs ...
on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine." Assistance
was broadened in 1967 to include local forces in Laos and Thailand. Reports on
such expenditures were submitted only to the armed services and appropriations
committees of each house. One would not know from the general language of the
statutes what type of financial arrangements the Administration might enter into,
or with what country. Staff people, who had access to the reports, told me they
did not know the nature and dimension of financing the Free World Forces until
hearings were held by the Symington subcommittee.
Legislation in 1969 and i97o tightened up the language of the statutes somewhat by placing a ceiling on the funds that could be given to Free World Forces.
Standards were also established for payments of overseas allowances. 4 The ceiling
of $2.5 billion, which exceeded the amounts spent in previous years, did not constitute
much of a restriction. The fiscal 1971 appropriation bill for the Defense Department
included a proviso stating that nothing in the Act should be construed as authorizing
the use of funds "to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed
to provide military support and assistance" to the governments of Cambodia and
Laos. The force of that restriction was diluted by another provision which declared
that nothing in the Act should be construed "to prohibit support of actions required
to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. Forces from
Southeast Asia, or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.' 35
On February 8, 1971, after the United States had provided support for South
Vietnam's intervention in Laos, the State Department justified the U.S. support
partly on the ground that it "will protect American lives." 36
a'Hearings on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Republic of Korea
(part 6) Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, gist Cong., 2d Sess. 1529-47 (1970).
"' Act of Mar. 15, x966, Pub. L. No. 89-367, § 401, 8o Stat. 37; Act of Mar. 25, 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-375, § 102, 8o Stat. 82; Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-22, § 301, 8 Stat. 53; Act of Sept. 29,
1967, Pub. L. No. 90-96, § 639, 8i Stat. 248.
"'Actof Nov. x9, i969, Pub. L. No. 91-121, § 401, 83 Stat. 2o6; Act of Oct. 7, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-441, § 502, 84 Stat. 905.
"5Act of Jan. 1I, 1971, Pub. L. No. gi-668, § 838(a), 84 Stat. 2037.
"N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1971, at x7, col. 6.
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The fiscal i972 authorization bill for the Defense Department repeated the ceiling
of $2.5 billion for Free World Forces, along with the restriction' on actions by Vietnamese and other Free World Forces in Cambodia and Laos? 7 Despite those restrictions, the Administration had provided funds to support thousands of Thai
forces in Laos. The State Department denied that this support represented a violation of legislative restrictions. The State Department explained to Senator Symington
that the "Thai forces in Laos are composed exclusively of volunteers, most of whom
have served in the Thai Army, but have been discharged."' Another explanation
rested on the theory that the soldiers were not really Thais but rather ethnic Lao
from northwest Thailand. After a trip to Vietnam, Congressman Jerome Waldie
said that Souvanna Phouma, in the presence of Ambassador Godley, told him
"'those troops aren't Thais-they are really Laotians living in Thailand.' And he
told us this with a straight facel"' 9
The theories of "volunteers" and "ethnic Lao" were not supported by newspaper
accounts. Reports in the Washington Post and in the Washington Evening Star
described the Thai soldiers serving in Laos as regular army troops of Thailand who
had been asked to accept special assignment in Laos for extra pay. 0
B. CIA Financing
Covert financing has been used to finance, through the Central Intelligence
Agency, such diverse activities as military operations in Laos and the broadcasting
of U.S. information to Eastern Europe and Russia. The CIA can do this because
of its extraordinary authority over the transfer and application of funds. The Central
Intelligence Act of 1949 provides that the sums made available to the CIA "may
be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the
expenditure of Government funds .... ." For objects of a confidential nature, such
expenditures are accounted for solely on the certificate of the CIA Director, with
each certificate deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount certified. 41 The Act also
authorizes the CIA to transfer to and receive from other government agencies "such
sums as may be approved by the Bureau of the Budget" for the performance of
any functions or activities authorized by the National Security Act of X947. Other
government agencies are authorized to transfer to or receive from the CIA such
"' Act of Nov. 17, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-156, § 5o, 85 Stat. 427 (repeated in the fiscal 1972 appropriations bill for the Defense Department, Pub. L. No. 92-204, § 738, 85 Stat. 734 [Dec. 18, 197x]).
8 117 CoNG. Rae. S1 5 ,76 9

(daily ed. Oct. 4, 197x).

s, 117 CoNG. REc. E49IO (daily ed. May 24, 197I).

" Newspaper accounts by D. E. Ronk in the Washington Post, Aug. 9, '97', and Tammy Arbuckle
in the Washington Evening Star, Sept. 23, X971, appear in 117 CoNG. REC. S15,768-69 (daily ed. Oct. 4,
1971). Staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported in 1972 that Thai irregulars

were "recruited by the Royal Thai Army from all over Thailand" and that "no special effort was made
to recruit ethnic Lao as distinct from other Thai." The cost of maintaining the Thai irregular force
for a year in Laos was estimated at approximately $Soo million. STAFF OF THE SENAa FOREIGN
RELATI s Comm., 92d CoNG., 2d Sas,., THAI.L.Nm, L os, AND CAMBODIA: January 1972, at 19-20 (Comm.
Print 1972).

'50

U.S.C. § 403j(b) (1970).
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sums "without regard to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting transfers
between appropriations."
I. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty; Laos
Early in 1967 it was reported in the press that the CIA had been secretly subsidizing religious organizations, student groups, labor unions, universities, and private
foundations. President Johnson appointed a three-member committee, headed by
Under Secretary of State Katzenbach, to review the relationships between the CIA
and private American voluntary organizations. On March 29 the committee reported
that covert CIA assistance had been made available by the last four administrations,
dating back to October i95i. The committee recommended that "[no] federal agency
shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any
of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations." President Johnson
accepted the committee's statement of policy and directed all agencies of the
government to implement it fully.43
A footnote to the committee's report explained that its statement of policy did
not entirely close the door to covert financing of private voluntary organizations.
Exceptions might be necessary: "Where the security of the nation may be at stake,
it is impossible for this committee to state categorically now that there will never
be a contingency in which overriding national security interests may require an
exception-nor would it be credible to enunciate a policy which purported to do
so.""

The CIA continued to finance the broadcasting that had been conducted by
Radio Free Europe to Eastern Europe and by Radio Liberty to Soviet Russia. The
continuation could have been justified either on the ground of national security or
by identifying RFE and RL as foreign-based institutions-as distinct from "any
of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations." The latter had been
the thrust of the Katzenbach report.
In an address delivered in January 1971, Senator Case said that several hundred
million dollars had been expended from CIA budgets over the previous two decades
for RFE and RL broadcasting. He introduced a bill to require that future broadcasting of the two stations be subject to annual authorizations passed by Congress.45
President Nixon recommended in May 1971 that Congress create a tax-exempt nonprofit corporation to finance and supervise the two stations.4' The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee rejected the President's recommendation, and on August 2 the
full Senate upheld the committee.4 7 During subsequent months the House and the
Senate differed on the precise means of supporting the radio stations, but the
2

.50 U.S.C. § 4 03f (1970).

"8"CIA Support to Private Organizations," 3 WzEE.LY Comp. Pits. Doe. 556-57 (1967).
CoNo.

"3
,S.

See also 23

Q.

ALIMfANAC 358-61 (1967).
W ExLY Coma'. PRaa. Doc. 557 (1967).

z8, 92d Cong., ist Sess. (971); 117 CONG. REe. S13o (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1971).
"N.Y. Times, May 24, 1971, at 5, col. i.
47S. REP. No. 39, 92d Cong., ist Sess. (1971); 117 CONG. Rac. S12,756 (daily ed. Aug.
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form of interim financing was no longer covert. A supplemental appropriations act,
for example, provided a conditional $32 million grant to Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty.4
Senator Case, who sits on both the Appropriations and the Foreign Relations
Committees, apparently had to rely on an article in the Christian Science Monitor
to learn that the Administration had agreed to finance Thai troops in Laos.40 Further investigation by Senate staff members disclosed that the CIA was covertly
financing 4,8oo Thai troops fighting in northern Laos in support of the Laotian
government. The cost of the operation was initially estimated at between $xo
million to $30 million a year, but a staff report prepared for the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee later disclosed that the CIA had spent at least $70 million
in Laos during fiscal 19710 ° During debate on the military authorization bill for
fiscal 1972, Senator Symington offered an amendment to establish, with one exception, a ceiling of $2oo million on U.S. expenditures in Laos during the fiscal year
1972. The exception was the costs cofnected with combat air operations by U.S. forces
over the Ho Chi Minh trail area in southern Laos. He later raised that ceiling
to $350 million. The Senate adopted his amendment by a vote of 67 to ii, and it
was included in the bill signed into lawY1
2.

Congressional Controls

'There appears to be little legislative supervision of CIA expenditures. Senator
Symington is a member of a five-man Armed Services subcommittee responsible for
reviewing CIA programs. On November io, i97i, he said that the subcommittee
had yet to meet during the year.52 The other subcommittee in the Senate charged
with overseeing the CIA is in the Appropriations Committee. With regard to the
CIA operation in Laos, Senator Ellender, former chairman of that committee, said
that he "did not know anything about it." He did not ask whether CIA funds were
being used to carry on the war in Laos: "It never dawned on me to ask about it.""8
This frank exchange then took place between Senators Cranston and Ellender:
Mr. Cranston. .

.

. I am sure I never would have thought to ask such a

question. But it appeared in the press that perhaps that was happening. I would
like to ask the Senator if, since then, he has inquired and now knows whether that
is being done?
Mr. Ellender. I have not inquired.
Mr. Cranston. You do not know, in fact?
"Pub. L. No. 92-184, 85 Stat. 640 (Dec. 15, 1971).
""7 CONG. REG. S75o3 (daily ed. May 20, 1971).
"Washington Post, May 22, 1971, at AI7, col. I; STAFFs'OF THE SENA'E FoREIGN RELATIONS COMm.,
92d CoNG.,

isr Sass., L&os: A.mai x971, at 3 (Comm. Print 1971). The $70 million figure is not cited

directly; it represents the balance after deducting military assistance and AID figures from the fiscal 1971
total.
51 117 CONG. Rac. S15,762-82 (daily ed. Oct. 4, x97); Pub. L. No. 92-156,
(Nov. 17, 1971).
52 117 CoNO. REc. S17,996 (daily ed. Nov.
10, 1971).
as 1i7 CONG. REc. S19,527 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1971).

§ 505, 85 Stat. 428
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Mr. Ellender. No.
Mr. Cranston. As you are one of the five men privy to this information, in fact
you are the No. i man of the five men who would know, then who would know
what happened to this money?
The fact is, not even of the five men, and you are the chief one of the five men,
know the facts in the situation.
Mr. Ellender. Probably not.54
Senator McGovern introduced a bill on July 7, 197i, to require that proposed
appropriations, estimated expenditures, and appropriations for the CIA shall appear
in the budget as a single item. His bill would also prohibit the use of funds
appropriated to other departments or agencies from being spent by the CIA.
McGovern explained that a single sum in the budget would permit members of
Congress to judge whether that amount was too small, too large, or fully adequate to
meet the needs of intelligence gathering. It would, in short, enable Congress to do
what it is supposed to do, decide priorities. Moreover, Congress and the taxpayer
would know for the first time the exact amount of money going into other government programs. The current practice is to inflate certain agency and departmental
budgets in order to conceal CIA money. "As a result," McGovern observed, "we
are led to believe that some programs are better financed than, in fact, they are.
We have no way of knowing what these programs and agencies might be."' During,
a recent debate on a bill to provide funds for military intelligence, Senator Fulbright
commented: "When you look at an item in this bill you wonder if it is really the
amount of money for the A-i 4 , for example, or if it is for the NSA. One cannot
tell what it is." 6
C. Military Assistance
On the basis of a GAO report, Senator Edward Kennedy charged that money
appropriated for refugee programs, public health, agriculture, economic and technical projects, and for the "Food for Peace" program, had been diverted to pay
for CIA-directed paramilitary operations in Laos. The term "refugee" was a
euphemism used by the Agency for International Development to cover the development and support of these operations. Hearings in 1972 confirmed that AID
funds had been used to supply Lao military and paramilitary forces with food and
medical care and supplies. 7 AID continues to supply these services as before, but
funds are now advanced by the CIA and the Defense Department to cover the costs.
"I1d. at S9,529. House supervision of the CIA does not appear to be much better. Rep. Lucien N.
Nedzi, chairman of one of the two subcommittees in the House responsible for overseeing intelligence

work, suggested that only the Budget Bureau and the Kremlin had a full understanding: 'Perhaps
they are the only ones. We simply don't have that kind of detailed information.... I have to be
candid and tell you I don't know whether we are getting our money's worth." Washington Post, Dec. 21,
197z, at A28, col. i.
" S. 2231, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (I971); 117 CONG. REc. S10,527 (daily ed. July 7, 1971).
re 117 CoNG. Rac. 89,526 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 197).
" Hearings on Problems of War Victims in Indochina (Part h Cambodia and Laos) Before the
,Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39, 41 (1972). See Washington Post, Feb. 7,
1971, at A2, col. 8; Washington Sunday Star, Feb. 7, 1971, at Ai, col. i.
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This is simply one example of how funyds can be appropriated for economic and social
programs and yet end up financing a secret war.
During hearings held in January 1971, the Joint Economic Committee discovered
that nearly $700 million iv Food for Peace funds had been channeled into military
assistance programs over the past six years. Since 1954, in fact, when Public Law No.
480 was enacted, $1.6 billion of funds generated by Food for Peace have been allocated
to military assistance.58 Statutory authority exists for this use,' but few members
of Congress were aware that Food for Peace was such a capacious vehicle for
military assistance. Nor could they have gained that understanding by reading
the budget, which describes Food for Peace in these terms: "The United States
donates and sells agricultural commodities on favorable terms to friendly nations
under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (Public Law 480).
This program combats hunger and malnutrition, promotes economic growth in
developing nations, and develops and expands export markets for U.S. commodities." 00
Senator Proxmire castigated this use of rhetoric to conceal the full scope of the
Food for Peace program. "This seems to me," he said, "to be kind of an Orwellian
perversion' of the language; food for peace could be called food for war."' He joined
with Senators Humphrey, McGovern, and Mansfield in introducing a bill to repeal
a provision which presently bars military aid to any country receiving Food for
Peace surplus unless that country agrees to permit the use of U.S.-held foreign
2
currencies for military procurement.
No one can determine from a present-day budget how much is spent for military
assistance. The budget for fiscal 1972 estimates 1971 outlays for military assistance
at $1.175 billion in Defense Department funds, plus an additional $504 million in
supporting assistance. 63 The total is apparently $i.679 billion. In January I971, however, Senator Proxmire obtained from the Defense Department its estimates for the
Military Assistance Program (MAP) and foreign military sales. The amount of
military assistance for fiscal 197i was as follows: (r) $3226 billion in MAP, "military
assistance service funded," and related programs; (2) $6oo million in supporting
assistance; (3) $7 million in additional public safety programs; (4) $x43 million
for Food for Peace funds for common defense purposes; and (5) $2.339 billion in
military export sales. The total: $6.317 billion-"
"sHearingson Economic Issues in Military Assistance Before the Joint Economic Comm., 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 2, 293 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Economic issues).
7 U.S.C. § 1704(c) (1970).
oU.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, Tim BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GovERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 1972, HousE Doc. No. 15, Pt. X, 92d Cong., ist Sess., 0I (s971) [hereinafter cited aq
TBE BUDGET (FISCA. 1972)].

"Economic Issues 61.
62 S. 905, 92d Cong., ist Sess. (X97x). The substance of this bill was included in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, enacted into law on Feb. 7, 1972, as Pub. L. No. 92-226, § 20x(c), 86 Stat. 25. Enactment does not affect the basic authority to use Food for Peace funds for military purposes, but
such use would be more voluntary. See note 59 supra.
" ThE BUDGET (FIsCA.

x972) 86, 96.

etECOnomiC Issues 203. The total is $z million higher than the sum of its parts, since the latter
are rounded off.
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Prior to I965, the scope of military assistance was essentially defined by the
Military Assistance Program, which was administered by the State Department and
authorized by the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs committees. With the
build-up in Vietnam, however, military aid to Saigon was taken out of MAP and
placed under a category called military assistance service funded (MASF). The effect
was to transfer budget control to the Pentagon and place authorization decisions
under the jurisdiction of the armed services committees. In 1966, military assistance
to Laos and Thailand was also switched from MAP to MASF. Service-funded
assistance to South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand totaled more than $io billion for
the period from fiscal 1966 to fiscal 1971.65
On March 8, 1971, Senator Proxmire introduced a bill to remove from the
Defense Department its present involvement in service-funded military aid. All
remaining military assistance programs would be put under the Department of
State. The object would be to return to the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs
committees the responsibility for authorizing military assistance funds.68
III
TRANsFEES BETWEEN CLAssEs

A. History
Specific Congressional authorization sometimes permits the President to take
funds that have been appropriated for one class of items and to re-apply those funds
elsewhere. This practice has been the source of dispute for almost i8o years. In
x793, Representative Giles of Virginia offered a number of resolutions that charged
Hamilton with improper use of national funds. The first resolution stated that
"laws making specific appropriations of money should be strictly observed by the
administrator of the finances thereof." Representative Smith of South Carolina
proceeded to refute Giles point by point, arguing that the Administration ought to
be free to depart from Congressional appropriations whenever the public safety or
credit would thereby be improved. When exercised for the public good, executive
spending discretion would "always meet the approbation of the National Legislature. '""T The Giles resolutions were subsequently voted down by the House.
This appears to be a typical collision between the legislative and executive
branches, but the dispute was not as much constitutional as it was partisan and
personal. It was Hamilton's colleague in the Cabinet, Thomas Jefferson, who had
"Id.

at 19o. See Kaufmann, Double-Talk Bookkeeping, THE NAnON, Nov. 1, 1971, at 429.

'S. X129, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (197); 117 CONG. Ruc. S2566-7i (daily ed. Mar. 8, I97I). The
Foreign Assistance Act of x97i (not enacted until February 7, 1972) shifted Thai military assistance from
the armed services committees to the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs committees. Pub. L. No.
92-226, § 513, 86 Stat. 25. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1972, as reported out by Foreign Relations,

attempted to do the same thing for military assistance to South Vietnam and Laos. S. RE,. No. 823,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1o (1972). The Senate rejected the bill by a 42-48 roll-call vote. I8 CONG. Rue.
Sxi, 672 (daily ed. July 24, 1972).
67 3 ANr;ALS or CONG. 902 (1793).
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drafted the resolution for Giles. The author of Smith's effective rebuttal was none
other than Hamilton himself.6
Jefferson's strictures against transfers were excessively narrow and failed to halt
the practice. During his own Administration, one Congressman explained that
it was sometimes necessary to allow expenditures to deviate from appropriations by
taking funds from one account and applying them to another. Such transfers were
technically illegal, but "its being the custom palliates it."' 9 Proposals to abolish
transfers altogether were countered by two arguments. Secretary of the Treasury
Crawford told Congress in 1817 that legislators, in receiving reports of transfers,
automatically learned where appropriations had been redundant and where deficient, thus providing a convenient guide for future appropriation' bills. Furthermore, removal of transfer authority would encourage executive departments to submit inflated estimates as a cushion against unexpected expenses. Crawford warned
Congress: "The idea that economy will be enforced by repealing the provision will,
I am confident, be found to be wholly illusory. Withdraw the power of transfer,
and the Departments will increase their estimates." 7
Statutes over the next few decades permitted transfers under various circumstances 7 Beginning ir i868, Congress repealed all previous acts authorizing
transfers and stipulated that "no money appropriated for one purpose shall hereafter be used for any other purpose than that for which it is appropriated."7
Nevertheless, during periods of great emergency, Congress delegates broad transfer authority to the executive branch. The 1932 Economy Act cut federal spending
so indiscriminately -that Congress permitted the Administration to transfer funds
from one agency to another to repair the damage:" The Lend Lease Act of X941
appropriated $7 billion for ordnance, aircraft, tanks, and for other categories of
defense articles. The President could transfer as much as twenty per cent of the
appropriations from one category to anther, provided that no appropriation would
be increased by more than thirty per cent.7 4 In 1943 the Budget Director was
authorized to transfer ten per cent of military appropriations made available for fiscal
1944, subject to certain conditions. Appropriations in that particular act came to
about $59 billion.75 Contemporary examples of this transfer authority inlude the
Defense Department appropriation act for fiscal 1971, which permitted the Secretary
"86 Tim WErNGs oF ThomAs JEFFERON x68 (P. Ford ed. 1899); 2 B. MITCHELL, ALEXANDER
H2OlLTON

260-63

(9.57).

:0 11 ANNALs OF CONG., 320 (i8o)
o3

(remarks of Congressman Bayard).

ANNALs OF CONG. 421 (1817).

'Act of May 1, 1820, ch. 52, § 5, 3 Stat. 568; Act of July 3, 1832, ch. 154, 4 Stat. 558; Act of
June 30, 1834, ch. 171, 4 Stat. 742; Act of July 2, 1835, ch. 268, § 2, 5 Stat. 78; Act of Apr. 6, x838, ch.
54, 5 Stat. 223; Act of Aug. 26, 1842, ch. 202, § 23, 5 Stat. 533; Act of Aug. so, 1846, ch. x77, § 5, 9
Stat. IoI; Act of Mar. 3, 1847, ch. 48, 9 Stat. 171.
2
" Act of Feb. 12, 1868, ch. 8, § 2, 15 Stat. 36.
"'Act of June 30, 1932, ch. 314, § 317, 47 Stat. 4X1; see L. WnmRnwo, supra note x,at 18o-84.
"' Act of Mar. 27, 1941, ch. 30, § i(c), 55 Stat. 54.
' Act of July 1, 1943, ch. 185, § 3, 57 Stat. 367.
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76

of Defense to transfer up to $6oo million. That authority was increased to $750
million for fiscal 1972 as a means of giving the Secretary of Defense greater flexibility
1
in coping with Congress's $3billion reduction in the defense budget.
B. Aid to Cambodia
Current law states that "Except as otherwise provided by law, sums appropriated
for the various branches of expenditures in the public service shall be applied solely
8
to the objects for which they are respectively made, and for no others."" Exceptions
to that general rule are fairly common, however, as evidenced by the use of transfer
authority by President Nixon in extending financial assistance to Cambodia after his
intervention there in the spring of 1970.
At the end of i97o the President appealed to Congress for $255 million in
military and economic assistance for Cambodia. Of that amount, $Ioo million was
to restore funds which the President had already diverted to Cambodia from other
programs. Operating under the authority of Section 61o of the Foreign Assistance Act
of I96I, 7° the Nixon Administration borrowed $4o million from aid programs
originally scheduled for Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, and the Philippines; took another
$5o million from funds that had been assigned largely to Vietnam; and diverted
still other funds until a total of $108.9 million in military assistance had been given,
or committed, to Cambodia."
In the waning days of the Ninety-first Congress, legislators tried to place two
restrictions on' Presidential actions in Cambodia. The Special Foreign Assistance
Act of 1971 barred the use of funds to finance the introduction of U.S. ground
troops into Cambodia or to provide U.S. advisers to Cambodian forces in Cambodia8 l Those restrictions were blunted by the remarks of House conferees, who
accepted the restrictions only on the understanding that (i) U.S. troops could be
used in border sanctuary operations designed to protect the lives of American soldiers,
(2) U.S. military personnel could be provided to supervise the distribution and
care of U.S. military supplies and equipment deliveries to Cambodia, and (3)U.S.
military advisers could train Cambodian soldiers in South Vietnam."' Moreover, in
the Administration's bombing operations in Cambodia, air power was interpreted
in such broad terms as to circumvent much of the legislative restriction. When
"oAct of Jan. 11, I97I, Pub. L. No. 91-668, § 836, 84 Stat. 2036.
"Pub. L. No. 92-204, § 736, 85 Stat. 733 (Dec. x8, 1971); see 117 CoNG. REc. H12,567 (daily ed.
Dec. 14, 197). Transfers made under this authority are to be submitted to the Committees on Appropriations as "reprogramming actions" (to be explained in the next section of this article) requiring
prior approval; H.R. RaP. No. 754, 92d Cong., ist Sess. 16 (1971).
7s31 U.S.C. § 628 (1970).
70 22 U.S.C. § 236o (1970). Under this section, the President may transfer up to ten per cent of
the funds from one program to another, provided that the second program is not increased by more
than twenty per cent.

o
'oHearings on Supplemental Foreign Assistance Authorization, x97 , Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, gist Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 78 (1970).

"' Pub. L. No. 91-652, § 7(a), 84 Stat. 1943 (Jan. 5, 197).
"' H.R. RaP. No. 179i, 9iSt Cong., 2d Seas. 5 (1970).

LAw

150

AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

helicopter gunships have the capability of patrolling at treetop level, the distinction
between air power and "ground troops" begins to disappear 8 8
Some restrictions do remain on the extent of Presidential discretion under the
Special Foreign Assistance Act of i97i. For example, the President is prohibited
from exercising certain transfer authorities granted to him for the purpose of
providing additional assistance to Cambodia unless he notifies the Speaker and the
Foreign Relations Committee in writing at least thirty days prior to the date he
intends to exercise his authority, or ten days if he certifies in writing that an emergency exists requiring immediate assistance to Cambodia. The notification to the
Speaker and the Foreign' Relations Committee would include the authority under
which he acts and the justification for, and the extent of, the exercise of his
s A more recent act, the Foreign Assistance Act
authority.~
of 1971 contains a provision which prevents the President from exercising his transfer authority under
certain sections of the Foreign Assistance Act of ig6, as amended, unless he gives
the Congress advance notice prior to the date he intends to exercise those authorities.8 5

IV
REPROGRAMMING

Reprogramming is a term used to describe the shifting of appropriated funds
from the original purpose to a new purpose. Unlike transfers, reprogramming does
not depend on statutory authority. Instead, it operates on an informal clearance
and reporting procedure worked out by executive agencies and Congressional committees. Furthermore, reprogramming does not involve the shifting of funds from
one appropriation account to another (as with transfers), but rather the shifting
of funds within an account. For instance, if an appropriation bill provides a billion
dollars for a single account, that figure could be broken down into perhaps a hundred
separate subaccounts on budget justification sheets or in committee reports. Thus,
when funds are shifted from an original purpose to a new purpose, the shift would
take place between' these nonstatutory subaccounts rather than between statutory
accounts.
The reprogramming procedure is partly a remedy for the long period of time that
exists between an agency's justification of programs and its actual expenditure of
funds. During that interval new and better applications of funds come to light.
New factors arise to prompt the use of funds in a manner different from that called
for in the appropriations act or committee report. The House Appropriations Committee has explained that reprogrammings are effectuated for a number of reasons,
'Another

provision in the Special Foreign Assistance Act of X971 stipulated that military and

economic assistance to Cambodia "shall not be construed as a commitment by the United States to
Cambodia for its defense." Id. § 7(b). The discussion in the final section of this article, regarding
unauthorized commitments, makes it dear that a commitment nonetheless exists.

84Id. § 8.

" Pub. L. No. 92-=6, § 652, 86 Stat. 28 (Feb. 7, x972).
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including "unforeseen requirements, changes in operating conditions, incorrect
price estimates, wage rate adjustments, legislation enacted subsequent to appropriation
action, and the like.""6 Reprogramming takes place in such areas and agencies as
public works, the Atomic Energy Commission, foreign assistance, the District of
Columbia, and the Defense Department.
In recent years military reprogramming has run to more than a billion dollars
a year. During fiscal 1970, for instance, the House Appropriations Committee received reprogramming requests from the Defense Department for a total dollar
change of more than $4.7 billion (299 increases totaling $2.4 billion and 422 reductions totaling $2.3 billion) .s Although defense reprogramming at the multibilliondollar level is relatively recent, the transition from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy
Administrations resulted in heavy use of reprogramming. Budget revisions by
the Kennedy Administration brought the fiscal i96i reprogramming figure for the
Defense Department to at least $3.8 billion', 8
A. Clearance Procedures
The appropriations committees, while recognizing the need for some degree of
flexibility for the executive branch, are also aware that excessive reliance on reprogramming can downgrade the appropriation process. In 1955 the House Committee on Appropriations requested the Defense Department to submit semi-annual
reports on all reprogramming actions. The Pentagon responded by issuing a set
of instructions to define the scope of reporting requirements and to set forth criteria
for what would constitute a "major reprogramming" action. 9 The following year
the House Appropriations Committee expressed its dissatisfaction with certain
reprogrammings. This dissatisfaction arose from such Defense Department practices
as describing backlogs in maintenance and repair work and then taking funds appropriated for those purposes and using them for something else. As a result, the
committee directed that there be no diversion in the future of funds appropriated
for repair and maintenance. 0
A 1959 report by the House Appropriations Committee observed that while the
semi-annual reports had been helpful, they had not been sufficiently timely. Moreover,
the practice of having the military services advise the committee informally of
major reprogrammings had become "virtually inoperative." As a result, the committee directed that the Defense Department report periodically-but in no case
less than thirty days after departmental approval-the approved reprogramming
actions involving Si million or more for operation and maintenance, $i million or
so
8 7H.R. REP. No. 493, 84th Cong., ist Sess. 8 (1955).
H.R. REP. No. 157o, 9st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970).
s HousE Comm. oN Aw4ED SEvicEs, 89Tm CONG., isr SEss., D ArsTmNr OF DEFENSE REPROGRAmSNG Op APPROPRIATED FUNDs: A CASE STUMy 32 (Comm. Print 1965).
soH.R. REP. No. 493, 84 th Cong., ist Sess. 8 (1955); DOD instructions are included in Hearings on

Budgeting and Accounting Before the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 84 th Cong., 2d Sess.
(C956).
r3RN9
"0
H.R. REP. No. 2X04, 84th Cng., 2d Sess. 13 (1956).
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more for research, development, test, and evaluation, and $5 million or more for
procurement. New instructions were prepared by the Pentagon to accommodate the
Committee's request. 1
A report by the House Appropriations Committee in x962 noted "with some
concern" that there had been no revision of Defense Department instructions for
reprogrammings since 1959, although "significant changes based on mutual understandings" had occurred since that time. The committee asked that the instructions
be revised immediately. 2 The revised DOD directive called for prior approval by
the committees, not only by the appropriations committees, but also by the authorizing
committees. Prior approval of selected items and programs was required of the armed
services and the appropriations committees from both houses. In situations where
prior approval was not required, the committees were to be "promptly notified"
(that is, within two working days) of approved reprogramming actions.93
Current DOD practices include calling for semi-annual reports, obtaining prior
committee approval on certain items and programs, and making prompt rotification
to the committees on other reprogrammings. A DOD directive describes "prior
approval" by the committees in the following way: in the event the Secretary
of Defense is not informed of approval or disapproval within fifteen days of
receipt by the committees of a reprogramming request, it would be assumed that
there was no objection to implementing the proposed reprogrammingY4 In actual fact,
prior approval means explicit approval, whether it takes the committees fifteen
days, a month, or longer.
B. Circumventing Committee Control
It is evident that reprogramming can become a convenient means of circumventing the normal authorization and appropriation stages. Instead of obtaining approval
from Congress as a whole, agency officials need only obtain approval from a few
subcommittees. An agency could request money for a popular program, knowing
that Congress would appropriate the funds, and then try to use the money later for
a program that might not have survived scrutiny by the full Congress.
Reprogramming is used on occasion to undo the work of Congress and its
committees. A recent example concerns the Defense Intelligence Agency. DIA
had requested $66.8 million for fiscal x971. The House Appropriations Committee
cut that request by $2 million, in large part on the conviction that DIA was heavily
overstaffed. DIA reduced its budget by only $7ooooo, having successfully prevailed
upon the Defense Department to request reprogramming for $i.3 million to make
"xH.R. REP. No. 408,

86th

Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (ig59); DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPoRT oN RE-

PROGRAMMING OF APPROPRIATED FuNDs,

DARTmENr OF DEFENSE IN;s'ucIoN No. 725o.5 (Oct. 23,

1959).
" H.R. REF. No. x6o7, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 21
98 DERMENT OF DEFENSE REPROGRAMMING
DncnvE No. 7250.5 (Mar. 4, 1963).
" DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPROGRAMMING
Dni~cnv No. 725o.5, at 3 (May 21, 1970). See

(1962).
OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
S. HORN, UNUSED POWER 192-95 (x970).
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up the difference. Representative Jamie L. Whitten was incensed by this maneuver:
"Am I to understand that after Congress developed the record and made reductions
on that basis, we are to have them come in here and ask for restoration, which is
what it amounts to, of funds that the Congress saw fit to eliminate?""9 House
Appropriations allowed the Defense Department to reprogram $700,000 for DIA.
Another extraordinary use of reprogramming involved the Defense Special
Projects Group (DSPG). The Defense Department wanted to initiate a research
project that would cost $4 million. On any new research project of $2 million or
more, the Defense Department must submit the request for committee review. In
this case, however, DSPG was advised by the Defense Department to use $i million
to begin the project. The Pentagon would then supplement that later by transfering $3 million from the Emergency Fund. By the time the reprogramming
request reached Congress, the project was three months underway. Representative
Whitten described the attempted circumvention of the $2 million threshold in these
terms: "You took a million dollars and got it started, and now you come up here and
we are caught across the barrel. You have already started with a million dollars,
but the million dollars was part of something which cost more than $2 million
and clearly comes within the reprograming agreement." 6
The House Appropriations Committee rejected this reprogramming request.
Not only that, the request helped pique the committee's interest. DSPG was a
new name for the Defense Communications Planning Group (DCPG). Congress
was under the impression that DCPG-having been responsible for the electronic
battlefield ("McNamara Line")-would be disbanded and the program transferred
to the military services. Instead, DCPG adopted a new name and dreamed up
new research projects to keep itself alive. To the question "what in the world are they
doing over there?" the legislative answer was not favorable. The House Appropriations Committee characterized the attempt to perpetuate DSPG as "a classic
example of bureaucratic empire building and of the bureaucratic tendency to never
end an organization even after the work for which it was created has been concluded." ' Appropriations committees in both houses agreed to terminate the
agency s
C. Broader Legislative Control
Reprogramming procedures, as they have evolved over the past few decades, now
include a larger number of legislators in the review role. In earlier years requests
for defense reprogramming were handled by the chairmen and ranking minority
members of the defense appropriations subcommittees. At the present time, in House
g Hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for Z972 (part 2) Before the House Comm.
on Appropriations, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 33X (1971).
" Id. at 6xo.
"7H.R. RP. No. 666, 92d Cong., ist Sss. ii8-i9 (197).
" Id. at i S; S. R.P. No. 498, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 197 (197); H.R. Rap-. No. 754, 92d Cong., ist
Scss. 14 (971).
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Appropriations, approval is granted by the full defense subcommittee. In Senate
Appropriations, reprogrammings for minor matters were formerly decided by the
chairman and ranking minority member of the defense subcommittee. The full
subcommittee was brought together only for major reprogrammings. Beginning
in T972, all prior-approval reprogrammings-whether major or minor-were brought
before the full subcommittee during regular hearings on the defense budget.
With regard to authorizing committees, the full House Armed Services Committee acts on reprogramming requests. In earlier years the Senate Armed Services
Committee used to delegate such decisions to the committee chairman, ranking
minority member, and committee counsel. In 197o a separate Subcommittee on
Reprogramming of Funds was established. Depending on the issue involved, this
five-member subcommittee may decide the request or else pass it on to the full
committee. The tendency has been toward greater involvement by the full committee.
Legislative efforts to monitor reprogramming occasionally go beyond the review
responsibilities of designated committees. For instance, early in 1971 Secretary Laird
expressed interest in' obtaining funds to begin a fourth nuclear-powered carrier
(CVAN-7o). If it became necessary to submit a budget amendment or initiate a
reprogramming request, he would be willing to give up $i39.5 million that had been
requested for an oil tanker and three salvage ships." Senators Case and Mondale
were able to enlist the support of Senator Ellender, chairman' of the Appropriations
Committee, and of Senator Stennis, chairman of Armed Services. The two chairmen
agreed that reprogramming would be an improper technique for providing funds.
The Administration would have to follow normal budgetary procedures: a budget
request from the President followed by Congressional authorization and appropriation. The Administration decided to postpone making that request until a subsequent fiscal year. 100
Thus, in the case of controversial reprogramming requests, the review role extends
beyond the designated committees to involve Congress as a whole. To take another
example, the Defense Department submitted a reprogramming request in 1971 for
an additional $61.2 million for the Cheyenne helicopter. That covered approximately $35 million to reimburse the contractor for services performed, S9.3 million
to continue the development program during fiscal 1972, and approximately $17
million to continue it during fiscal 1973. Since the Cheyenne had been under attack
by members of Congress in recent years, only the reimbursement portion of the
reprogramming request was approved. The House Appropriations Committee
denied the request for fiscal 1973 development on the ground that "it did not seem
"0 Hearings on Fiscal Year 1972 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development,
Construction and Real Estate Acquisition for the Safeguard ABM and Reserve Strengths (part z) Before
the Senate Armed Services Comm., 9st Cong., Ist Sess. 97, 258-59, 978 (197).
...N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1971, at 40, coi. 3; Washington Post, Apr. 28, 1971, at A8, col. 5. The
correspondence between Senators Case and Mondale and Senator Ellender is reprinted in Hearings on
Department of Defense Appropriationsfor Fiscal Year 1972 Before the Senate Comm. on Appropriations,
92d Cong., Ist Sess. 1344-45 (97x).
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proper to anticipate the will of Congress with respect to the Cheyenne program
that far in advance."'' 1 With regard to fiscal 1972 development, $9.3 million was
placed in the appropriation bill as a separate and identifiable item so that the full
Congress could work its will on the request. 0 2
A still broader review by Congress over the reprogramming of funds is contemplated in a bill introduced by Senator Lawtonf Chiles in March 1971.03 His bill
would require the Comptroller General to compile information on reprogramming
and to furnish such information to all committees and to all members of Congress.
V
TRPANsF S IN TimE
In addition to being transferred from ont class of appropriations to another,
or within a class, funds may be transferred from one year to the next. Congress
enacted legislation in 1795 to restrict this practice. With certain exceptions, any
unexpended funds remaining in the Treasury for more than two years were to be
0
transferred to a surplus fund. At that point the appropriation would lapseP'
Nevertheless, administrative actions could nullify the law's intent. For instance,
Congress passed legislation in 1819 to suppress the slave trade and to punish crimes
of piracy. In'so doing, it neglected to appropriate funds to pay for these new
responsibilities. President Monroe supplied the necessary vessels by using old
balances remaining on the books of the Navy Department. When legislators protested that this violated the two-year limit, they were told that the balances were
exempt from the law because they had been in the hands of the Treasurer (who
acted as agent for the military departments), rather than being in the Treasury
itself.'0
An 1820 statute directed the Secretary of the Treasury to place funds that had
been left unexpended by the departments of War and Navy into a surplus fund.
Implementation of that statute, however, depended on a statement from the secretary
of the department that "the object for which the appropriation was made has been
effected."' 10 By failing to make such a declaration the department could have access
to those funds in future years.
A more stringent provision appeared in 1852. Congress directed that any moneys
unexpended after two years be carried immediately to a surplus fund, with the
appropriation regarded as having ceased. Decisions by the Attorney General quickly
diluted the force of that restriction. In cases of contracted items, personal service,
or other claims on the government, appropriations would remain available from
"' H.R. REP. No. 666, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. io5 (197I).
102S. REP. No. 498, 92d Cong., ist Sess. 18 (1971); H.R.

(197).
...S. 1333, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).

R,. No. 754, 92d Cong., ist Sess. 13

A similar bill (H.R. 10429) was introduced by Repre-

sentative Fascell on August 5, 1971 -

'01Act of Mar. 3, 1795, ch. 45, § i6, I Stat. 437.
20535 ANr;NAs oF CONG. 807-09 (i819); see L. Wimx
10 Act of May 1, 1820, ch. 52, § I, 3 Stat. 567.

miN, supra note z, at 83-94.
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year to year until the obligation was fully discharged. In such situations "unexpended" came to mean "unobligated," and the appropriation did not lapse into
the surplus fund.107 In a second decision, the Attorney General held that it was
proper for a department to begin a year by first expending old balances. Since old
money would be used first, the Attorney General explained that it would be impossible for a balance of two or more years to exist "unless the balance of a previous
year exceed in amount the whole expenditure of the present year .... ,108
A. No-Year Money
New statutes appeared in i87o and 1874 to restrict the use of unexpended
balances. Specifically excluded from those restrictions, however, were appropriations
for projects funded by permanent or indefinite appropriations, such as rivers and
harbors, lighthouses, fortifications, and public buildings.10 Current law permits
appropriations to "remain available until expended" for public works under the
Bureau of Yards and Docks and for public buildings n ° Such appropriations are
referred to as no-year money. Appropriations in this form permit the President to
release funds when he determines that they can be spent in the most effective
manner, depending on the availability of labor and materials and on the state of
technical development.
According to article I, section 8, of the Constitution, appropriations to raise and
support armies shall not be for a longer term than two years. Yet no-year financing
for military procurement has been upheld in several opinions by the Attorney
General. A 19o4 opinion argued that to raise and support an army was one
thing; to equip it was another. The constitutional prohibition applied only to the
former. That sounds a little like a distinction without a difference, but the opinion
also argued that the power to arm and equip armies followed from the constitutional
power to declare war, to raise and support armies, to provide forts, magazines, and
arsenals and to levy and collect taxes to provide for the common' defense,."
In the Department of Defense, appropriations for procurement and for research,
development, test, and evaluation (R.D.T. & E.) have generally been made available
on a no-year basis. For fiscal 1970, the amount of no-year funds for those categories
came to $25.5 billion."1 In an' effort to bring carryover balances under closer
legislative control, the fiscal 1971 appropriation bill for the Defense Department
adopted a multi-year approach. Appropriations for major procurement became available for only three fiscal years (except for shipbuilding, which requires a five-year
term), while appropriations for R.D.T. & E. were made available for only a two-year
period.11 3
...
Act of Aug. 31, 1852, ch. xo8, § xo, ro Stat. 98; 7 Or. Arr'y Ga. x (854).
10g7 Or. Arr'y GEN. 14 (1854).

...Act of July X2, 1870, ch. 251, § 5, 16 Stat. 251; Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 328,
11031 U.S.C. §§ 635, 682 (1970).
11125 Op. Aerr'y GEN. 1o5 (1904); see also 40 Op. Arr'y GEN. 555 (1948).
...Act of DcC. 29, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-171, tits. IV & V, 83 Stat. 475-79.
1
" 'Act of Jan. Ur, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-668, § 842(a), 84 Stat. 2037.

§ 5,

x8 Stat. 11o.
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B. Carryover Balances
When the Administration accumulates large unobligated balances, the traditional
Congressional response is to treat this as a sign of poor financial planning and a
threat to legislative control. To a certain extent, the executive branch thereby in
fact becomes independent of legislative action. As a result, the appropriations committees have tended to take into account these "carryover balances" in their decisions
on new funding requests.
It is to the advantage of the executive branch to report as low a figure as
possible for carryover balances, and several techniques have been tried, not always
successfully, toward this end. For example, an executive department may try
to obligate as much of the funds as possible. Sometimes this means prematurely
obligating funds before testing or developmental work has been completed. In
the case of weapons systems such as the Sheridan armored vehicle and Cheyenne
helicopter, this tactic can prove embarrassing if not counter-productive for the Administration. The House Appropriations Committee has remarked that "Budgetary considerations based on fear of losing funding authority have often dictated such
decisions rather than sound technical judgment."' 14 Large obligations become
especially suspicious when they take place in the closing months of a fiscal year
("June buying"), or when emergency and contingency funds are used at the end
of a fiscal year.
Carryover balances can also be minimized by the executive departments by underestimating the amount of unobligated funds that will be carried forward into the
next fiscal year. For example, the Army estimated that $3o.I million in unobligated
funds for R.D.T. & E. would be carried forward into fiscal 1962; the actual amount
carried forward was more thanx $89 million. For this same period, the comparable
figures for R.D.T. & E. in the Navy was $26.7 million estimated and $134.3 million
actual. Where there is a pattern of underestimating unobligated balances, the appropriations committees may make budget reductions to avoid overfunding." 5 Budget
cutbacks may also be made when there is too much unobligated money being carried
forward from year to year. One such action occurred in 1967 when the House
Appropriations Committee ordered a decrease in weapons procurement funds (primarily Navy) because the military services were maintaining excessive unobligated
balances." 6
Despite these legislative actions, a huge volume of funds continues to flow from
one year to the next. The budget for fiscal 1973 shows an estimated 266.7 billion
in unspent authority available from prior years. Of that amount, only $98.3 billion
was expected to be spent in fiscal 1973, with the remainder carried forward once
Sess. 48 (ig6g).
5H.R. REP. No. 16o7, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 48-49, 51

1 1 H.R. REP. No. 698, 9st Cong., Ist
't'

(1962).

...H.R. REP. No. 349, goth Cong., ist Sess. 35-36 (1967).
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again to later years' 1 7 All of the $266.7 billion is appropriated money or the
equivalent. Some of it consists of authorization to borrow from the Treasury; some
of it is authority to incur obligations without further action by Congress, as with
the Highway Trust Fund. Hence, whether in the form of appropriated money
or the equivalent, the amount of $266.7 billion was available for expenditure without further Congressional action. 118 In justifying this discretion budget officials maintain that "full funding"-even though it results in large unobligated balances-leads
to better management of public funds than appropriating for projects and programs
in bits and pieces.
C. Accelerated Procurement
The Eisenhower Administration used "accelerated procurement" as an antirecession measure in 1958. Public works were accelerated, Housing and Home Finance
programs speeded up, and government supply levels raised, all in an effort to pump
more money into the economy and to stimulate recovery. This technique was not
without its drawbacks. Advance procurement adds to the cost of storage space and
inventory checks. It also creates administrative complications by forcing agencies
to depart from prior schedules and long-term contractual commitments.1 10 Moreover, with a fixed amount appropriated for these programs, acceleration at some
point must be balanced by deceleration unless new funds are provided. Thus, at
the very moment when the recovery phase needs reinforcement, the depletion of
alloted funds has a retarding effect. That is especially serious since the automatic
stabilizers, in the recovery phase, reverse direction and have a retarding effect of their
own.
In 1961, President Kennedy also relied on accelerated procurement to combat
recession. He directed the Veterans Administration to speed up the payment of
$258 million in life insurance dividends, making that amount available in the first
quarter instead of spread over the entire year. A special dividend payment of $z8
million was made later, thereby reinforcing the speed-up with new funds and
contributing a permanent boost to the economy. Kennedy also directed the heads
of each department to accelerate procurement and construction wherever possible;
he hastened payments to farmers under the price support program, increased the
annual rate of free food distribution to needy families from about $6 million
to more than $2oo million; and made immediately available to the states the balance
of federal-aid highway funds ($724 million) that had been scheduled for the
entire fiscal year.2 0
"'U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGrr,

Tim

BUM=E

OF T'rE UN-TnD STATES GovEaxMNT,

FISCAL YEAR 1973, at 42 (1972).
128 US. OFFICE OF MAMAGEMENT AND BuDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSES OF ThE UNITED STAS GovENMEET, FIsCAL YEAR 1973, at 97-105 (1972).
1
JW. Lwxs, JR., FEDERAL FISCAL POLICY Irf THE Pos'rwAu RECESSIONS 221-27 (1962).
120
Id. at 250-72. See also, U.S. PR.ISmEN7, PusLIC PAPEs OF Tmf PREMSENTs: JOHN F. KENNEr
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PREIDENT, 1962, at 97-98 (196-).
1961, at 41 (1962); U.S. PREwSEDENT,
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VI
IMPOUNDMENT

Impoundment of funds is a "transfer in time' that deserves separate treatment.
During the past three decades, Presidents have withheld funds from such programs
as the B-7o bomber, Air Force groups, antimissile systems, flood control projects,
highways, supercarriers, urban renewal projects, and Model Cities. By refusing to
spend appropriated funds, the President provokes the charge that he is obligated
under the Constitution to execute the laws, not hold them in defiance-obligated to
interpret appropriation bills not as mere permission to spend but as a maifdate to
spend as Congress directed. Otherwise, the argument runs, he encroaches upon the
spending prerogatives of Congress, violates the doctrine of separated powers, and
assumes unto himself a power of item veto that is neither santtioned by the
Constitution nor granted by Congress.
A number of authors of law journal articles, in advancing this line of argument,
invoke phrases from Supreme Court decisions to bolster their case. Examination of
those decisions, however, suggests that they have only the most tenuous relationship
2
The
to the issue of impoundment and offer little hope of resolving the dispute'
decisions
court
and
decisive appeal over the years has not been to legal principles
but to constituencies and agency support. In the words of one author, the President
"can and may withhold expenditure of funds' 22to the extent that the political milieu
in which he operates permits him to do so.'
Political leverage is maximized, of course, by claims of constitutional support, and
both sides therefore invoke the separation doctrine and the "intent of the framers"
to their own advantage. The efforts largely cancel one another. When Congress
appropriates and the President refuses to spend, legislators chastise him for encroaching upon their spending prerogatives. Yet if Congress tried to compel the
President to spend the funds, he could charge usurpation of administrative responsibilities.
A. Basis for Impoundment
Instead of introducing into this discussion pieces of evidence from prior court
decisions, I think it is more instructive to understand the larger political, economic,
and legal framework within which impoundment takes place. It has long been the
practice of the executive branch to treat appropriations as permissive rather than
mandatory. President Jefferson, for example, notified Congress in i8o3 that the
sum of $5oo0o appropriated for gunboats remained urdexpended: "The favorable
and peaceable turn of affairs on the Mississippi rendered an immediate execution of
that law unnecessary.. . ."' An opinion by the Attorney General in 1896 main"x Fisher, Funds Impounded by the President: The Constitutional Issue, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 124
(x969).
112 Miller, Presidential Power to Impound Appropriated Funds: An Exercise in Constitutional
Dedsion-Making, 43 N.C.L. REv. 502, 533 (5965)
OF MESS.GaS AND PAP's oF THF PR.EIDNTS, supra note 3, at 360.
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tained that an appropriation was not mandatory "to the extent that you are bound
to expend the full amount if the work can be done for less... :, 2 4 The Hoover
Commission report in 1949 recommended that the President should have authority
to impound funds, provided that "the purposes intended by the Congress are still
carried out."12'
When the President impounds funds on that basis, few legislators are likely to
challenge him. George Mahon, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee,
has said that "the weight of experience and practice bears out the general proposition
that an appropriation does not constitute a mandate to spend every dollar appropriated.... I believe it is fundamentally desirable that the Executive have limited
powers of impoundment in the interests of good management and constructive
economy in' public expenditures."' 2 8
Not only is the President permitted limited powers of impoundment to be
exercised at his discretion; in some cases he is required by law to withhold
expenditures. By law, the President is expected to set aside funds for contingencies
or to effect savings whenever they are made possible "by or through changes in
requirements, greater efficiency of operations, or other developments" that take
place after funds have been appropriated.P 7 The vague and undefined terms of this
provision obviously give the President wide latitude to impound funds: what, for
example, constitutes "changes in requirements," or "greater efficiency of operations,"
or "other developments"?
Other statutes require that funds be withheld under conditions and circumstances
spelled out by Congress. The 1964 Civil Rights Act empowers the President to withhold funds from federally financed programs in which there is discrimination by
race, color, or national origin1 2 8 01 the basis of that provision, special desegregation
grants may be terminated when school districts violate civil rights requirements. A
x968 act requires states to update their welfare payment standards to reflect cost-ofliving increases." Failure to comply with the act can lead to a cutoff of federal
welfare assistance. The Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 required
expenditure reductions, most of which were achieved by administrative action180
The spending ceilings adopted by Congress for fiscal years 1969, 197o, and 1971 pro121

2

Op. ATrr'y GEN- 415 (x896).

Similar statements appear at 21 Op,. ATT'y GEN. 392, 422

"(9681)
',THE ComnssoN o

ORGANIzATIOm Op THE ExzcUTrvE BRANcH OF THE GOVEnRsENT, BUDoETINO

AND AccousNTNo, A REPORT TO TnE CONGRESs 17 (1949).
126 Letter from Representative George Mahon to Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Feb. 25, x969 (copy

.obtained from Mr. Eugene B. Wilhelm, staff assistant, House Committee on Appropriations).
12131 U.S.C. § 665(c)(2) (1970).
28 42 U.S.C. § 200od-x (1970).
2942
U.S.C. § 6o2(a)(23) (1970). For accounts of threats made by HEW during x971 to
,relief funds from Calif., Ind., Neb., and Ariz., see the Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1971, at A2,
-N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1971, at 15, col. I; Washington Post, Jan. 28, 197x, at A18, col. I; N.Y.
'Mar. 29, 1971, at 19, col. z; and N.Y. Times, Apr. i, X971, at 24, col. 3.
18031 U.S.C. § Il (1970). See L. Fsima, PRESIDENT Am CONGRESS: PowER alm PoLicr
1972).

cut off
col. 1;
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vided the executive branch with additional authority to withhold funds.131 Foreign
assistance acts have directed the President to withhold economic assistance in an
amount equivalent to the amount spent by any underdeveloped country for the purchase of sophisticated weapons systems, unless he informs Congress that the with32
holding of such assistance would be detrimental to the national security.'
i. Military Procurement

Presidents have also withheld funds on their own initiative after determining
that it would be wasteful or unwise to spend money on weapons systems. President
Eisenhower, for instance, impounded funds for the production of antiballistic missiles,
insisting that funds should not be released until developmental tests were satisfactorily completed.' 33 A major dash between legislative directives and executive
discretion occurred in i96I when Congress added $i8o million! to the $2oo million
requested by the Kennedy Administration for development of the B-7o bomber (later
designated RS-7o). Defense Secretary McNamara, after stressing the U.S. advantage
over the Soviets in bombers and the deterrent capability of American missile strength,
refused to release the unwanted funds. The House Armed Services Committee
threatened to "direct" the Administration to spend money for production, but later
Even if Congress had
removed the language at the urging of President Kennedy.'
followed through with its threat to mandate expenditures, the President could well
have argued that there were too many developmental unknowns, too many technical
problems unresolved, and therefore no justification for proceeding beyond the
prototype stage.
In such situations it is contended that the President thwarts the will of Congress.
It is not always easy, however, to know what that will is. President Truman's impoundment of Air Force funds in i949 would appear to be a dear denial of legislative
intent, and yet the issue was not at all that simple. The House had voted to
increase Air Force funds, while the Senate sided with the President in opposing
the increase. The matter lay deadlocked in conference committee, with adjournment
close at hand and the military services in' need of funds to meet their payrolls. A
Senate motion to vote continuing appropriations was rejected by the House. To
break the impasse, the Senate reluctantly accepted the extra Air Force funds, but
with the understanding, as Senator Thomas said, that "if the money is appropriated
it may not be used" by the President. 3 3 In light of that legislative history, it is
clearly an oversimplification to say that Truman's impoundment of funds represented
a denial of "the will of Congress."
"

See FIsHER, PREsmENT AND CoNGREss: POWER AND PoLicy, supra note 130, at io6-io.

"I See, e.g., Act of Feb. 9, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-194, § i19, 84 Stat. io.

..U.S. PRESIDENT, PUBLIC PAPE.RS OF THE PRESIDENTS: JOHINF. KENNEDY, Ig6o-6I, at 54-55, 414
(196i).
"'For discussion on this dispute and other impoundment controversies, see Fisher, The Politics of
Impounded Funds, 15 AD. Sci. Q. 361 (1970).
18' 95 CONG. REC. X4,355 (1949). Note also the exchange between Senators Ferguson and Salstonstall
at 95 CoNG. Rac. 14,855 (949); Fisher, The Politics of Impounded Funds, supra note 134, at 366-67.

LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

Impounding Funds to Promote Executive Domestic Priorities
In the cases cited thus far, funds were withheld in response to statutory directives
or justified as good management of funds for weapons procurement. A different
situation developed under the Nixon Administration; funds were withheld from
domestic programs because the President considered those programs incompatible
with his own set of budget priorities. Priorities and impoundment were at issue in
1969 when President Nixon annbunced 'plans to reduce research health grants, defer
Model Cities funds, and reduce grants for urban renewal. During that same period
he proceeded with his own preferences, such as the supersonic transport, a new
manned bomber, a larger merchant marine fleet, and the Safeguard ABM systemY' 0
In 'the spring of i97i the Nixon Administration announced that it was withholding more than $12 billion, most of which consisted of highway money and funds
for various urbanY programs. When Secretary Romney appeared before a Senate committee in March, he explained that funds were being held back from various urban
programs because there was no point in accelerating programs that were "scheduled
for termination." He was referring to the fact that Congress had added funds to
grant-in-aid programs, whereas the Administration wanted to consolidate those
programs and convert them into its revenue-sharing proposal."" To impound funds
in this prospective sense-holding on -to money in anticipation' that Congress will
enact an Administration bill-is a new departure for the impoundment technique.
Money is not being withheld to avoid deficienties, or to effect savings, or even to
fight inflation, but rather to shift the scale of budget priorities from one Administration to the next, prior to Congressional action.
Another example of how the Nixon Administration used impoundment to
promote its domestic priorities involved public works projects. The Administration
went ahead with the projects it had recommended to Congress but deferred, without
exception, all of the additional projects that Congress had wanted. The Deputy
Director of the Office of Management and Budget offered this explanation to a
House subcommitee: "Given the necessity for retrenchment in some areas, I think
it is inevitable that the President would feel that the items he included were items
that should be released first."'3 8 The subcommittee did not ask the Administration
to identify its authority for giving priority to its programs while deferring Congressional add-ons.
2.

B. Legislative Remedies
As a partial remedy for the withholding of funds by the President, Congress has
adopted "floors," or minimum levels, below which the Administration could not go.
"" Fisher, The Politics of Impounded Funds, supra note 134, at 372.
...Hearings on The Withholding of Funds for Housing and Urban Development Programs, Fiscal
Year z97z, Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Aflairs, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 163,
x65- (1971).
8
Hearings on Public Works for Water and Power Development and Atomic Energy Commission
Appropriations (part 6) Before the House Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Public Works].
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In 1958, for instance, the Eisenhower Administration wanted to reduce the strengths

of -the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard, both of which had strong
support in the local communities. Congress retaliated by providing mandatory
language to maintain the strengths at higher levels.' 39
Political pressure has also been used to pry loose impounded funds. After the
November 1966 elections, President Johnson announced a $5.3 billion reduction in
federal programs. Sensitive to criticism from the states, he released some of the
money in February 1967 and, on the eve of a conference the following month with
governors, released additional amounts. 40 Pressure also came into play in the fall
of 197o after President Nixon had withheld some education funds. Two weeks before
the November elections, in the midst of widespread criticism from school districts,
the Administration announced that the money was being released. When a Cabinet
officer was asked whether the pending elections had prompted the Administration to
reverse its position and free the funds, he replied, smiling, that there was "no con141

nection whatsoever."'
These pressure tactics and confrontations, even when successful, are not wholly
satisfactory to the mayors of large cities dependent on federal funds. They must
take time from their busy schedules to come to Congress in support of authorization
bills for urban programs. They testify a second time in behalf of an' appropriation
bill. Now they must come to Congress and to the Administration a third time
to see that the money, having already been authorized and appropriated, is actually
spent.
In March i97i, the Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers held hearings
for the purpose of establishing better legislative control over impounded funds.
Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., chairman of the subcommittee, introduced a bill several
months later to require the President to notify Congress within ten days whenever
he impounds funds appropriated for a specific purpose or project. The President's
message would include the amount of funds impounded, the specific projects or
functions affected, and the reasons for impounding the funds. Congress would then
have sixty days to pass a joint resolution disapproving the impoundment'a Senator
Ervin introduced a subsequent bill in September to provide that an impoundment
action by the President shall cease at the end of sixty calendar days unless Congress
approves the action by concurrent resolution. 43 This bill is stronger than its predecessor in two respects: it provides for affirmative approval instead of a resolution
of disapproval, and it relies on a concurrent, resolution (which cannot be vetoed)
instead of a joint resolution (which must be presented to the President).
189 Act of Aug. 22, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-724, 72 Stat. 715. See S. Rm. No. 1578, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess.1 5 (x962).

"Fisher, The Politics of Impounded Funds, supra note 134, at 370-71.
,'Washington Post, Oct. 23, xi7o, at A6, col. z (remarks of HEW Secretary Richardson).
143S. 2027, 92d Cong., ist Sess. (1971); Hearings on Executive Impoundment of Appropriated
Funds Before the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 92d Cong., ist Sess. (1971).
"t S.2581, 9 2d Cong., ist Sess. (i97X).
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This kind of legislation assumes that Congress has the power to compel expenditures. While it is true that a legal memorandum issued by an official in the Nixon
Administration affirms the power of Coxzgress to mandate expenditures for the impacted areas program, 4 ' the President could exert his prerogatives elsewhere. In the
area of defense procurement, in particular, the President could take the position
that Congress cannot deprive him of his judgment and discretion in the administration of programs ad management of funds.
Another approach for legislative control is to take back from the Administration
some of its reasons for impounding funds. As a result of the spending ceilings adopted
by Congress in recent years, the Administration has argued that certain funds have
to be withheld in order to avoid the risk of exceeding the ceiling. Congress did not
adopt a spending ceiling for fiscal x97. Rep. Joe L. Evins explained to a budget
official that "the Congress feels that they don't want to give you a flexible ceiling
which you could use as a tool to freeze and impound funds as you did in the
145
past."'
During debate on the Revenue Act of 1971, the Senate considered an amendment by Senator Humphrey to require the President to transmit to Congress
and to the Comptroller General a report on impounded funds. The report would
include such features as the-amount of funds impounded, the date of impoundment,
the departments affected, the reasons for impoundment, and the period of time
during which the funds are to be impounded. The Senate adopted the amendment
by a vote of 48 to 18,14" but the amendment was not considered in conference
4
because of question raised regarding its germaneness under House rulesY 7
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 contained a provision which made the
obligation or expenditure of funds available under the Foreign Assistance Act and
the Foreign Miitary Sales Act contingent upon the release of certain impounded
funds. The Comptroller General would have to certify that the Administration had
released, by April 3o,1972, a little over $2 billion in funds for programs administered
by the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.'4"
VII
UNAUTHORIZED CoMMITMENTs

Article x, section 9, of the Constitution provides that "No money shall be
drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law."
Presidents have nevertheless found it expedient at times to enter into financial
" Memorandum by William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
Dec. r, x969, reprinted at x6 CONG. Rac. S158 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1970).
'Public Works, supra note 138, at 13.
Ito117 CONG. REc. S18, 4 85 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1971).
1"" H.R. REP. No. 708, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 59 (1971).
"'1Pub. L. No. 92-226, § 658, 86 Stat. 32 (Feb. 7, 1972). See Xi7 CONG.

REe. S21,903 (daily ed.

Dec. 17, 1971). The GAO subsequently reported that these funds, as of the deadline, had been released.
See x8 CONG. REc. H4o98 (daily ed. May 3, 1972).
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obligations not authorized by Congress. Jefferson, for instance, agreed to accept
France's offer to sell the whole of Louisiana for $iT,250,00--plus an additional
$3,750,000 to cover private claims against France-even though the offer exceeded
instructions set forth by Congress.149 Jefferson also relied on the executive prerogative in June 18o7, after a British vessel had fired on the American ship
Chesapeake. Without statutory authority, Jefferson ordered military purchases for
the emergency and disclosed his actions to Congress when it came back in session.
"To have awaited a previous and special sanction by law," he said, "would have
lost occasions which might not be retrieved."'150
In 186I, after the firing oif Fort Sumter, and while Congress was adjourned,
Lincoln directed his Secretary of the Treasury to advance $2,oooooo to three private
citizens, the money to be used for "military and naval measures necessary for the
defense and support of the Government ....
1 Also in this category of unauthorized commitments was the decision by Theodore Roosevelt to send an American fleet around the world, despite Congressional threats not to finance the
expedition. Roosevelt answered that he had enough money to take the fleet halfway
around the world. "[I]f Congress did not choose to appropriate enough money to get
the fleet back, why, it would stay in the Pacific. There was no further difficulty about
1 52
the money.'
The Supreme Court has occasionally reviewed some of the finanical initiatives
taken by executive officers. In one case, decided in 1833, the Court addressed
itself to the question of whether the head of an executive department could allow
payments not authorized by law. A unanimous decision observed that "A practical knowledge of the action of any one of the great departments of the government, must convince every person that the head of a department, in the distribution of its duties and responsibilities, is often compelled to exercise his discretion.
He is limited in the exercise of his powers by the law; but it does not follow
that he must show a statutory provision' for every thing he does. No government
could be administered on such principles.' ' ls Another Court decision involved
an agreement made between a government contractor and Buchanan's Secretary of
War, John B. Floyd. The contractor, lacking sufficient funds to complete the
order, was allowed to draw time-drafts and have them purchased by his suppliers
as a means of providing interim assistance. The government subsequently accepted
drafts of $5 million, but over a million dollars remained unpaid. Holders of the
unpaid drafts contended that Secretary Floyd's acceptances were binding on the
I A COMPILATION OP MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 3, at 357. Congress
initially appropriated $2,ooo,ooo to be applied toward the purchase of New Orleans and the Floridas. 12'
ANNALS OF CONG. 370-71 (1803); Act of Feb. 26, 1803, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 202. Supplemental appropria140

tions: Acts of Nov. 1o, 1803, ch. 2 and 3, 2 Stat. 245, 247.
50I A CompLmx oN oF MEssAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 3, at 428.
'
6 id. at 78.
15220 THE WoRxs oF TH-EODORa ROosEvELT 540 (rev. ed. 1927).
" United States v. Macdaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1, 14 (1833).
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government. The Court, however, dismissed their claim, denying that Floyd
possessed either constitutional or statutory authority to enter into his agreements. 5 4
In trying to prevent unauthorized commitments, Congress has had to soften
statutory language at times in order to allow army and navy supply agencies to sign
contracts in advance of appropriations. Otherwise, the material would not have
been available on time. Thus, when Congress prohibited unauthorized commitments
in i8zo, an exception was allowed for contracts for subsistence and clothing for the
army and navy, as well as for contracts by the Quartermaster's Department. Legislative delays in passing appropriation bills (enacted after one-fourth to one-third
of the year had elapsed) forced departments to make commitments and expenditures
not legally authorized. The Secretary of the Navy reported to Congress in 1825 that
his department, for nearly half the year, acted in "perfect ignorance of the law
under which it is bound -to act." As a result "The law is, necessarily, not complied
with, because it is passed after the act is performed."'5 5
Administrative discretion in the handling of funds regularly provoked the
ire of Congress. The Gilmer Committee reported in' I842 "Under color of what
are termed regulations, large amounts of money are often applied to purposes nbver
contemplated by the appropriating power, and numerous offices are sometimes
actually created in the same way."' 5' Funds generated from such governmental
activities as the postal service or customs collection invited executive discretion as
to their use. William T. Barry, Postmaster General from x828 to 1835, borrowed
large sums of money on the credit of the Post Office. His practice was defended
on the grounds that the Post Office Department "created its own funds" and that
bank loans were therefore simply a claim on future postal revenues.' 57 A Senate
report in x834 roundly condemned such practices anid justifications.'"5 In x842 the
House Committee on Public Expenditures complained that the Secretary of the
Treasury was using customs revenue to finance a naval force for the collection of
revenue. "He appropriates and pays," the committee said, "without the sanction
of Congress, and even without its knowledge. ' ro
A. Coercive Deficiencies
A statute passed in 1870 prohibited executive departments from spending in
a fiscal year any sum in excess of appropriations for that year; nor could any
department involve the government in any contract for the future payment of money
"'The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666 (1868).
"" Act of May 1, 182o, ch. 52, § 6, 3 Stat. 568. Secretary of the Navy, Report to the U.S. Congress,
in 2 AmMeCAN STATE PAPEas: NAVAL AFrAIRs ioi (x86o).

The 182o contract authority evolved into

the "Feed and Forage" Law, passed in 1861 and still part of the U.S. Code. In advance of authorizations or appropriations, the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are permitted to make
contracts or purchases for clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, transportation, or medical and
hospital supplies, to cover the necessities of the current year. 41 U.S.C. § 1s(a) (970).
...H.R. REP. No. 741, 27 th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-x8 (1842).
2"See L. W'rra, TIm JAcxsoNsuS 265-66 (1954).
288 S. REP. No. 422, 23d Cong., ist Sess. (834).
...H.R. REP. No. 756, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (:842).
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in excess of such appropriations 60 The thrust of that law was regularly blunted
by the incurring of deficiencies. If the departments ran out of money before the
end of the fiscal year there was little that Congress could do except pass a supplementary appropriation. The fault was not entirely that of the departments, however.
James A. Garfield, who had been chairman of the House Appropriations Committee
from 1871 to 1875, made this observation: "One of the vicious party devices too
often resorted to for avoiding responsibility for extravagance in appropriations is
to cut down the annual bills below the actual amount necessary to carry on the
government, announce to the country that a great reduction has been made in the
interest of economy, and after the elections are over, make up the necessary amount
by deficiency bills."''"
The Antideficiency Act of 1905 introduced the technique of monthly or other
allotments to prevent "undue expenditures in one portion of the year that may
require deficiency or additional appropriations to complete the service of the
fiscal year .... ."2 In the Antideficiency Act of 19o6, Congress stipulated that
apportionments could be waived or modified in the event of "some extraordinary
emergency or unusual circumstance which could not be anticipated at the time of
making such apportionment ... .""3 That constituted an admission by Congress
that regardless of spending patterns anticipated when passing appropriation billsor even after apportioning the funds--changing conditions might necessitate a
different course for expenditures.
Contemporary regulations on unauthorized commitments are far more explicit
than the Constitution. The U.S. Code contains the following admonition:
No officer or employee of the United States shall make or authorize an expenditure

from or create or authorize an obligation under any appropriation or fund in
excess of the amount available therein; nor shall any such officer or employee in-

volve the Government in any contract or other obligation, for the payment of
money for any purpose, in advance of appropriations6 4 made for such purpose,
unless such contract or obligation is authorized by law.'

Despite the rigorous nature of that language, there are a number of cases where
the Administration has presented Congress with a fait accompli and in effect compelled it to appropriate the necessary funds.
The commitments of troops to Korea by President Truman is one postwar
example. Military intervention began prior to the second United Nations resolution of June 27, i95o, and, despite the provisions of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, no attempt was made to obtain Congressional approval
for the venture. 165 The war in Southeast Asia-notwithstanding the adoption of
"'°Act of July 12, x87o, ch. 25x, x6 Stat. 2 51.
'OIL. WIMMERDIM, supra note I, at 141.
'a' Act of Mar. 3, 19o5, ch. 1484, § 4, 33 Stat. 1257-58.
208 Act of Feb. 27, 19o6, ch. 510, § 3, 34 Stat. 49.
a' 31 U.S.C. § 665(a) (x97o). But see 'Teed and Forage" Law, supra note 155.
185 L. Fisima, supra note 130, at 194-95.
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the Tonkin Gulf Resolution-has been another case of Presidential commitment first
and Congressional support second. The executive branch initiated the covert war
carried out prior to the Tonkin Gulf incident. Executive decisions were also responsible for filling out the scope of the commitment, including the bombing of
North Vietnam and the introduction of American ground forces. Executive commitments are evident even in peace negotiations. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs, told reporters on January 26, 1972,
that the Administration had offered North Vietnam "a massive reconstruction program for all of Indochina id which North Vietnam could share to the extent of
several billion dollars."1 66 It was later reported that the plan contemplated a fiveyear aid program of $5 billion for South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and $2.5
billion for North Vietnam.' 67
B. Cambodian Intervention
Another executive-inspired commitment resulted from the Cambodian intervention of the spring of 1970. Following his intervention there, President Nixon asked
Congress for $255 million in military and economic assistance for Cambodia. The
executive branch clearly involved the government in an obligation in advance of
appropriations, not only for the expenses resulting from the Cambodian operation
itself, but for future expenses as well. As Secretary of State Rogers explained to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on December io, 1970: "I think it is true
that when we ask for military assistance and economic assistance for Cambodia we
do certainly take on some obligation for some continuity."' 6 s In an interview with
a Washington, D.C., reporter, the Cambodian foreign minister said that he felt
there was an unwritten treaty between the two countries: "I am convinced that there
really is a moral obligation of the United States to help. We are confident that the
United States will continue to help us."" 9
The extent of this support was indicated in October 1971 when the Senate debated
an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act which would limit the total expenditure
in Cambodia to $250 million for fiscal 1972. The Administration opposed the restriction, contending that it would threaten the capacity of the Cambodian Government
to defend itself. John N. Irwin, III, Acting Secretary of State, offered Senator
Fulbright this appraisal: "We believe that with continued United States assistance
at the levels requested by the Administration, the Cambodians with some external
logistics and maintenance support will continue to make progress in defending their
70
country from foreign invasion.'
On October 29, during debate on the Foreign Assistance Act of r971, the Senate
...8 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doe. x28 (1972).
...Washington Post, Jan. 28, 1972, at AI, col. 2.

"' Hearings on Supplemental Foreign Assistance Authorization, z97o, Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, gist Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1970).
.e interview with Henry Bradsher, Washington Sunday Star, May 23, 1971, at A5, col. x.
170 117 CONG. REc. S6,390 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 197x).
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voted to increase the ceiling on expenditures in Cambodia from $250 million to
$341 million. The latter was the figure requested by the Administration. Thus, while
the Senate agreed to give the Administration what it wanted, it also asserted the
right of Congress to set limits on expenditures. The ceiling could not be circumvented by special powers and authorities, such as the ability of the Pentagon to
declare defente articles "excess" and give them to Cambodia, or the broad authority
of the Defense Department and the CIA to transfer funds from one area to another.
If it turned out that more than $341 million was required, this provision required the
Administration to return to Congress for additional authorization."'
The $341 million ceiling did not apply to combat air operations over Cambodia.
Moreover, the House accepted the ceiling in conference, but only with amendments
which specifically excluded the obligation or expenditure of funds attributable to
South Vietnamese operations in Cambodia.'" The President signed the Foreign
Assistance Act oni February 7, i972"'-7
C. GAO Controls
It is generally assumed that the General Accounting Office is empowered
to decide the legality of a payment of public funds and that such decisions
are binding on the Administration. Several decisions have indeed been' issued by the
Comptroller General to disapprove expenditures by the executive branch. 7 4 However, it is also possible for the executive branch to invoke its own prerogatives and
oppose a GAO decision. Thus, in a letter directed to the Secretary of State on
December 13, i96O, the Comptroller General advised that program funds under the
Mutual Security Act would no longer be available because of the Secretary's failure
to forward certain documents and records to the GAO or to Congress, as required by
the Act. The Attorney General rejected that opinion on the ground that Congress
could not infringe on the right of "executive privilege" by forcing the President
to release information which he considers to be injurious to the national security
or the public interest' 7 5
As another example, in 196o the Defense Department entered into a written
agreement with a consortium of five NATO countries formed to produce Hawk
surface-to-air missiles in Europe. The Pentagon, lacking sufficient fuinds to fulfill its
part of the agreement, inserted a clause stating that the U.S. commitment was "subject to availability of funds." GAO took the positon that no express authorization
existed in law allowing DOD to enter into the purchase agreement, the commit171 117 CONG.

Rac. S17,69-75 (daily ed. Oct 29, 1971).
Ist SesS. 28 (I97).

172S. REP. No. 590, 92d Cong.,

'71 Pub. L. No. 92-226, § 655, 86 Stat. 29 (Feb. 7, I972).
174See, e.g., 42 CoMP. GEN. 226 (r962).
A GAO report states that decisions of the Comptroller

General "are final and conclusive on the executive branch and are binding on the General Accounting
Office in its audit." Functions of the General Accounting Office, S. Doc. No. 96, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
2r (1962).
175 41 Op. Arr'y GEN. 507 (x96o).
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ment did not comply with the intent of the Antideficiency Act, and that the
Pentagon had firmly committed the United States to buy four missile systems at an
unknown cost. Although GAO advised the Pentagon to take certain actions, the
Defense Department in December 1970 stated that it did not agree that there had
been any violation of law and that it did not consider any corrective action
176

necessary.

The GAO also dashed with the executive branch over the legality of the "Philadelphia Plan." In order to work on' federally assisted projects, contractors had to
set specific goals for hiring members of minority groups. On August 5, 1969, the
Comptroller General issued a decision in which he held that the Plan conflicted with
the x964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibited the setting up of any kind of
preferential treatment on the basis of race, color, or national origin. The Comptroller
General said it did not matter whether one designated the hiring commitment as a
"goal" or a "quota."' 7 The Secretary of Labor promptly announced that the Administration would continue to press ahead with the Philadelphia Plan. He said
that interpretation of the Civil Rights Act had been vested by Congress in the
Department of justice and that the Department had approved the plan as consistent
with the ActY 8s Moreover, the Secretary of Labor said that the Comptroller General
had ignored the President's Executive Order "as an independent source of law."' 0
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit later upheld the legality of the
Philadelphia Plan. The court justified this use of Presidential power partly on the
Chief Executive's implied power-as it relates to economical procurement policy-to
assure that "the largest possible pool of qualified manpower be available for the
accomplishment" of federal projects1 0'
GAO reviews, as in the case of payments to Free World Forces, have been
hampered by administrative delays and by refusals on the part of executive agencies
to allow GAO investigators access to future planning information, routine evaluative
reports, and program evaluation group reports.'8 1 To offset such difficulties, it has
been proposed that the Comptroller General should have subpoena authority to
compel agencies to make available books, accounts, and other contractor records
required for a GAO investigation. At' least forty executive agencies, independent
boards, and commissions have subpoena powers now. 82
IT'GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFICE, REPORT TO Tm SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON UNITED

36-37 (Comm. Print 1971).
49 Co-P. GEN. 59 (1969), reprinted at 11 CONG. REc. S9176-79 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1969).
IT842 Op. Arr'y GEN. 37 (1969), reprinted at 115 CONG. REc. SzI,318 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1969).
179 115 CONG. REC. S9954 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1969).
"" Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
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U.S. 854 (197).
"I"Hearings on Executive Privilege: The Withholding of Information by the Executive Before the

Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., ist Sess. 303-15 (i97).
I" Hearings on the Capability of GAO to Analyze and Audit Defense Expenditures Before the Senate
Comm. on Government Operations, 9st Cong., ist Sess. io5-o6 (1969). During the fall of 1970 the
Senate passed a bill (6,4432, gist Cong., 2d Sess.) designed to strengthen GAO access to departmental
records, but the bill was not acted upon by the House.
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CONCLUSION

We know from other studies, with a fair amount of detail, the discrepancies
that exist between the President's budget requests and the amounts authorized
by Congress. Comparable gaps exist between what is authorized and what is
appropriated. On these areas of the budget process we know a great deal. In contrast,
we know embarrassingly little about the expenditure phase. Why are there discrepancies between what is appropriated and what is spent? What, if anything,
should be done about it?
The information supplied in ithis paper should provide advocates of reform
with a little better understanding of what the problem is and why past efforts at
reform have not always produced beneficial and predictable results. It frequently
happens that the adoption of a reform proposal, intended to drive out one evil, simply
creates another that proves harder to extirpate. Take away the power to make
transfers, and agency officials pad their budgets. Eliminate discretionary authority
altogether, and agency officials incur deficiencies. Give the President the power to
allot funds-as a means of preventing deficiencies-and he uses that power to impound funds and further his own policies.
The reform advocate is therefore advised to regard executive spending discretion
as an essential, ineradicable feature of the budget process. Expenditures deviate
from appropriations for a number of reasons. Appropriations are made many months,
and sometimes years, in advante of expenditures. Congress acts with imperfect
knowledge in trying to legislate in fields that are highly technical and constantly
undergoing change. New circumstances will develop to make obsolete and mistaken
the decisions reached by Congress at the appropriatior stage. It is not practicable
for Congress to adjust to these new developments by passing large numbers of
supplemental appropriation bills. Were Congress to control expenditures by confining administrators to narrow statutory details it would perhaps protect its power
of the purse but it would not protect the purse itself. Discretion' is needed for the
sound management of public funds.
While there no doubt exists a need for executive flexibility, that is an abstract
term capable of hiding much mischief. The executive branch complains about
the vast amount of "uncontrollables" in the budget and yet somehow comes up
with a hundred million dollars to finance the Cambodian intervention. It is evident
that in a number of areas, including covert financing, impoundment, reprogramming,
transfers, and unauthorized commitments, Congress has yet to discover a satisfactory meant of controlling expenditures. Public policy is then decided by administrators rather than by elected representatives and the funds they provide.
The results are often incongruous. Congress goes through the formality of
authorizing and appropriating funds but the money is never spent. On the other
hand, Congress cad find itself locked into paying for administrative commitments
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it never authorized. The expenditure process is one in which administrators must
enjoy substantial discretion in exercising judgment and in taking responsibility for
their actions, but those actiovs ought to be directed toward executing Congressional,
not administrative, policy. It is up to Congress to make that policy clear and consistent.

